Better Yemen Days

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The Yemen Surprises

While I am not an "expert" on Yemen and have not ever claimed to be one, I have been watching and interacting with Yemenis for a few years now. As events unfold in Yemen, I am truly saddened. It's noticeable, and recently, a kind friend reached out to me about Yemen, and asked me what surprises me about the events in Yemen.  Here's a list of the "no surprises" and the "surprises."

1.      I am not surprised by the fact of resistance in Aden (and other areas of the south) to Houthis. Although I understand that for many people in the south the Houthis represent an existential threat, I am surprised by the level of their resistance.

2.      I am not surprised by the fact that there are anti-Hadi/pro-Houthi or pro-Saleh forces in the south. What surprised me was the rhetoric from southerners expressing surprise about the presence of such groups.

3.      I am not surprised by the fact that Sana'a showed no resistance to Houthis. A tour of the Old City in 2012 would have shown that Sana'a has been pro-Houthi since at least that time.

4.      I am not surprised that people in Sana'a hated Hadi, his political allies and by extension many southerners, where a number originated from. I am surprised how strong the hatred is.

5.      Finally, I am not surprised by KSA’s intervention into Yemen. However, I only expected cash intervention or some supplies, like what happened in 1994. I certainly did not expect the launching of air strikes and that these strikes would continue for more than one month.

How are things going to play out in Yemen?

No one—no matter how many years a Yemen or Middle East expert—has a real clue about how things are going to play out in Yemen, and that, unfortunately, includes those leading the fighting in Yemen.

The "musts" and the "should-have nots"
The Houthis, a Zaydi Shi'a group with stronghold in the very northern governorate of Saada,  should never have tried to advance into Sunni territories; the coalition should not have started an open-ended bombing campaign with no apparently-defined mission goals; and the international community should have stopped intoning the mantra of “preserving Yemeni unity and restoring the legitimate government of President Hadi” when all on-the-ground indications revealed widespread discontent.

The Houthis are an indigenous religio-political movement and they enjoy a fair amount of legitimacy in the north, but not in the south of Yemen.

The Houthis have pushed the southern Yemenis, even further away from the idea of unity. There is now real hatred and sectarianism across the broad spectrum of southern Yemenis, overriding previous sentiments even the most moderates among them.

The “legitimate” Yemeni government is unfortunately a farce – unable to assure basic security for anyone, including itself.

Continuing the old, unworkable models of operating, overcoming this crisis seems like a faraway dream, and the outcomes become even murkier as they days of conflict increase in number.

Like ostriches: Heads in the sand

Many Yemenis too need to get their heads “out of the sand” with regards to the realities of their nation’s limited resources and the extensive challenges Yemeni communities face daily. Yet, few Yemenis seem willing to make the hard choices needed.

 The reality is that many conflicts are actually driven by resource scarcity, including water, food, commodities, and capital. Experts estimate that a large percentage (maybe as high as 80 percent) of local conflict in Yemen is caused by water scarcity and associated land rights.

Yemen is acknowledged to be one of the most water-stressed countries in the world. So, what do many Yemenis do? They grow and/or use qat. Growing and the use of qat fritter away 50 percent of Yemen's water resources and does nothing to re-charge groundwater and certainly nothing to re-charge a failing economy.

Speaking of economy, Yemen’s oil production (its largest source of state revenue) has dropped dramatically since its high of a mere 441,000 barrels per day in 2001, and it is a net importer. Meanwhile the outdated subsidies programs are draining the national budget.

So why are Yemenis not embracing alternatives. For example, why aren't Yemenis riding bikes despite the minimal distances, flat terrain, and ideal weather (at least in Sanaa)?

Yemen has had little to no electrical power for years now while having ample and inexhaustible supplies of sun, so why does almost no one adopt solar power?

The Yemen crisis, as we are seeing it in 2015, has been years in the making. Yet, at every juncture, every party generally made decisions that favored short-term, narrow, and unsustainable interests, instead of decisions for the common good and the next generation.

While this fighting can’t last forever, to be optimistic about what might result is a serious disservice to Yemenis. Unfortunately it does not appear that something is going to magically change the way decision-makers operate in Yemen (or outside of Yemen) any time soon.

Those of us who can listen to the various sides of the Yemeni story (and there are many sides) hope we’re wrong and hope we’re surprised.